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A Post-Impact Fear of Pre-Impact Fright
Meg Ellen Phiilips'
Douglas K. Beynon, Jr. . . . was driving his employer's vehicle, within
the [fifty-five] m.p.h. speed limit. ... Beynon was approximately 192 feet
from the rear of Kirkland's [stopped] tractor-trailer when he became aware
of, and then reacted to, the impending danger of crashing into its rear. In
his attempt to avoid the collision, Beynon slammed on his brakes, as [71.51
feet of skid marks attest, and slightly veered to the right. Despite his efforts,
Beynon's vehicle collided with the rear of the tractor-trailer at a speed of
[forty-one] m.p.h., with the result that he was killed on impact.2
INTRODUCTION

W

anticipate
it-that moment of fear when we

all have experienced
E
rear-ending
the car in front of us after a sudden stop of traffic or a

moment of inattentiveness. Luckily, most of these moments are unfounded
and fleeting, overcome by our next conversation or song on the radio as we
continue our trip unharmed. Mr. Beynon, however, like many victims of
car accidents, drownings, or plane crashes, was not so lucky. For several
seconds before his car crashed into the parked truck, he recognized his
dire situation and likely feared what would ultimately become his death.

His fatal story became another tragedy and another lawsuit in which the
deceased's family sought damages from the owner of the tractor-trailer
in a wrongful death and survival action.' The controversial issue in this
case, however, was not whether the defendant was at fault in causing the
accident. Rather, in Beynon v. Montgomery Cablevision Ltd. Partnership,4 the
Court of Appeals of Maryland examined a topic that has left state courts
greatly divided: pre-impact fright in survival actions.'
Pre-impact fright is a tort claim seeking damages that "are recoverable
when the decedent experiences [fright] during the legitimate window

I JD expected May zol I, University of Kentucky College of Law; BA in Political Science,
2oo8, Transylvania University.
2 Beynon v. Montgomery Cablevision Ltd. P'ship, 718 A.2d I161, 1163 (Md. 1998).
3 Id. at I163-64.
4 Beynon,718 A.2d II61.
5 Jennifer M. Kirby, Recovery of Pre-Impact Fright Damages Allowed in Survival Actions,
TRIAL, Jan. 1999, at 92, 92; 3 DAMAGES IN TORT ACTIONS § 20.02 (2010) (stating that survival
statutes "compensate[] the decedent's estate for losses sustained by the decedent between
the time of injury and the time of death").
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of mental anxiety." 6 It is comparable to the common law tort action for
emotional distress because it seeks to "compensate a decedent's fright,
not the resultant death."' Unlike emotional distress, however, pre-impact
fright is a new cause of action.' It seeks to compensate an injury that is
not driven by physical harm, but rather by "fear, mental anguish, and lost
hope. It is a [purely] psychological injury." Pre-impact fright is also unique
because it awards damages for the psychological distress in survival actions,
where the victim did not survive the impact that generated the victim's
fear.'o The combination of these elements, pure emotional distress and a
deceased victim who experienced the fear before the accident, has made
some courts hesitant to adopt the doctrine."
Only recently have courts begun to recognize the concept as a valid legal
claim, and uniformity is lacking." While several jurisdictions have followed
the trend of recognizing pre-impact fright, and thus opened the door to
these speculative claims, others have refused to acknowledge the claims or
have avoided the issue altogether." This Note seeks to explore the recent
evolution of pre-impact fright as a recoverable element in survival actions
for the purpose of unraveling its vulnerability within the legal system. It
will discuss the three major approaches taken by jurisdictions in deciding
whether to recognize pre-impact fright, and, upon recognition, how far to
extend the remedy.14
Part I analyzes jurisdictions that reject pre-impact fright based on the
impact theory; courts utilizing this line of reasoning hold that an emotional
distress claim cannot exist without prior physical impact. Part II describes
the approach taken by jurisdictions that reject pre-impact fright because
no physical injury is manifested prior to the physical impact that causes
the decedent's death. Part III outlines jurisdictions that accept pre-impact
fright. An analysis of these jurisdictions in Part IV will reveal that preimpact fright may be theoretically and morally favorable, but practically the
claim is too speculative and difficult to objectify. This section highlights
the disparate and unpredictable awards granted by courts that recognize
pre-impact fright. Because pre-impact fright is impractical, unpredictable

6 25A C.J.S. Damages § 186

(2002).

7 Id.
8 Jeffrey J. Kroll, The Casefor Making Pre-ImpactFear Compensablein Survival Actions, 88
ILL. B.J. 462, 462 (2000) (citation omitted).
9 Id. at 463.
lo Id.at 462.
ii See infra Parts 1-11.
12 Id. at 462-63.
13 See infra Parts I-III.
14 The author acknowledges the narrow scope of this Note as it relates to only preimpact fright claims in mortality cases. Many other legal issues arise within the general discussion of pre-impact fright, but they are beyond the scope of this research.
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in its implementation, and unsubstantiated by legal theory, Part V of this
Note recommends alternative methods to use in replacing or rejecting preimpact fright in survival actions. Ultimately, these methods should lead to
more uniformity in the law and more consistent redress for plaintiffs.
I.

APPROACH TAKEN BY JURISDICTIONS THAT REJECT PRE-IMPACT FRIGHT

BASED

ON THE IMPACT RULE

Some jurisdictions reject pre-impact fright as a valid claim because they
follow the "'impact' rule."" This rule states that in order to file suit for
an emotional distress claim, a decedent must experience physical contact
or an injury (the impact) prior to the emotional distress.'6 The approach
follows the early common law "idea that emotional distress, standing alone,
was not actionable."" Opinions dating back to the nineteenth century
expressed concern over awarding damages for emotional distress based
upon the issue of proving causation.'" Historically, some courts "believed
that the proof necessary to establish a causal link between the distress and
the allegedly responsible conduct was too speculative."1 9 This thinking
continues to pervade jurisdictions and stands at the center of the impact
rule. 0 The basic premise is that physical contact must occur before the
onset of emotional distress because the element of causation is disturbed
when there is nothing tangible with which to link the mental distress.
Recently, the Supreme Court of Kentucky upheld the impact rule,
reiterating the historical concern that causation requires the emotional
response to be a resultofphysicalcontact.', In Steel Technologies, Inc.v. Congleton,
the court summarized succinctly the impact theory and its concern with
pre-impact fear: "The rationale for the current rule is that pre-impact fear,
like other alleged negligently caused emotional distress, is possibly trivial
and simply too speculative and difficult to measure unless [it is] directly
linked to and caused by a physical harm."" In this particular case, the
appellees sought to expand the requirement of physical contact to include
"trivial" touching or immediate subsequent contact." The appellees relied

15 See Kathleen M. Turezyn, When Circumstances Provide a Guarantee of Genuineness:
PermittingRecovery for Pre-ImpactEmotional Distress, 28 B.C. L. REV. 88I, 890 (1987); id. at 889
("In some jurisdictions the defendant's negligence had to include physical contact or 'impact'
with the plaintiff's person.").
16 See id. at 883.
17 Id. at 884 (citation omitted).
18 Id. at 885.
19 Id. (citation omitted).
20 See Steel Techs., Inc. v. Congleton, 234 SV.W
3 d 920, 929 (Ky. 2007) (citation omitted).
2I

Id. at 929-30.

22 Id. at 929 (citation omitted).

23 Id. at 929 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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on the Restatement (Second) of Torts to support this argument.24 Restatement
section 456(a) states that recovery is allowable for "fright, shock, or other
emotional disturbance resulting from the bodily harm or from the conduct
which causes it."2 5 The Supreme Court of Kentucky, however, rejected
the appellee's argument. It found the Restatement's approach to be overly
broad and not an accurate depiction of Kentucky's law.26 Specifically, the
supreme court concluded that the language of the Restatement, which
permits recovery for emotional distress resulting from conduct that causes
bodily harm, "amounts to an alteration of the impact rule making it merely
an accompanied-by-impact rule."" The court took the view, therefore, that
the Restatement approach does not meet the strict premise of the impact
requirement for emotional distress recovery under Kentucky law."
Steel Technologies addresses one of the major practical problems associated
with the pre-impact fright doctrine in survivorship actions: how does one
prove mental distress from an event without the traumatic event (physical
contact) occurring prior to the distress?29 Not only does pre-impact fright
raise a causation issue, but it also generates evidentiary concerns. 0 The
impact rule ensures that a solid foundation is laid for an emotional distress
claim. The causation element is easily met because the mental anxiety can
be assessed post-accident, and the evidence of the person's distress can be
exhibited and analyzed." As the court expressed, transitioning away from
the impact approach makes it more difficult to meet these elements and
burdens:
Crafting a new, reasonable rule that would still take into account the
concerns about the danger of fraud and speculative nature of mental harms
would be difficult without the proper case....
[Defining] a new rule is further exacerbated ... by the speculative nature
of the proof at trial, . . . [the lack of] scientific or medical proof of mental
injury, and [that] the victim herself [is] not available to testify, having been
killed by the impact."
The Supreme Court of Kentucky acknowledged that the need for the
impact rule may be diminished in cases where the victim survives the
incident. In these situations, first-hand testimony and evidence of the

24

Id. at 929.

25 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

§ 456(a)

(1965).

26 Steel Techs., 234 S.W.3d at 929.
27 See id. at 929-30.
28 Id. at 929.

29 See id. at 929-30.
30 See id. at 930.

31 See id. at 929.
32 Id. at 929-30.
33 Id.at 930 ("[llnjury actions could well give rise to a strong challenge to the impact rule
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distress are available, thus decreasing the need for a strict contact-based
rule.Y But pre-impact fright as a claim is typically associated with the fright
felt by a victim directly before death, and this Note focuses on the use of
pre-impact fright as a claim brought in survival actions. While the impact
rule is arguably too stringent in its insistence on a narrow recognition of
emotional distress, it serves a crucial function in its rejection of pre-impact
fright in speculative and potentially frivolous mortal injury cases. Estates
and family members may continue to seek damages for the victim's physical
injuries and death; therefore, the need for the pre-impact fright emotional
distress damages in survival actions is greatly lessened.
II.

APPROACH TAKEN BY JURISDICTIONS THAT REJECT PRE-IMPACT FRIGHT

BASED ON THE PHYSICAL MANIFESTATION REQUIREMENT

Some jurisdictions either supplement the impact rule or replace it
entirely with a new theory in order to reject pre-impact fright as a valid
claim for recovery. One theory frequently used by courts is what is
commonly known as the "physical manifestation requirement"; under this
approach, emotional distress may be recognized only if the distress itself
causes physical injury in the victim." This is distinct and separate from
any requirement under the impact theory, which states that the mental
anxiety must be a result of a physical impact upon the victim. Kansas is
one state that supplements the impact rule with the physical manifestation
requirement by implementing the latter when an emotional distress claim
is sought for the time period before an impact occurred.3 6 Thus, when no
physical impact occurred or when the physical impact occurred after the
anxiety, a plaintiff "may recover for his emotional distress only if it results
in physical injury.""
This theory, either in isolation from or in congruence with the impact
rule, practically forecloses any claim for pre-impact fright in survival actions.
Because it requires a physical injury resulting from the mental distress
experienced by the victim, most pre-impact fright cases will never meet
the burden of proof due to timing issues and speculation. Pennsylvania
acknowledged this difficulty when it rejected a claim for pre-impact fright
damages because the appellant presented no evidence that met the physical
manifestation requirement." In Nye v. Commonwealth, the court analyzed
a car accident survival action for pre-impact distress damages and stated,
in the future if the victim can give a first-hand account.
34 Id.
35 Fogarty v. Campbell 66 Express, Inc., 64o E Supp. 953, 963 (D. Kan. 1986).
36 Id. ("[A] plaintiff who experiences no physical impact may recover for his emotional
distress only if it results in physical injury.").
37 Id.
38 Nye v. Commonwealth, 48o A.2d 318, 322 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984).
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"the estate may recover damages for 'pre impact fright' only upon proof
that [the victim] suffered physical harm priorto the impact as a result of her
fear of impending death."3
Most pre-impact fright cases, like the fatal auto crash in Nye, present a very
brief time frame in which the fear of impending death and the consequent
manifestation of physical harm could occur. Also, the subsequent physical
injuries or death from the impact itself make it very difficult to determine
if any proposed emotional anxiety actually caused a physical injury. For
these reasons, the physical manifestation requirement makes it practically
impossible that a pre-impact fright claim could succeed in most survival
actions.
One might question why a jurisdiction would continue to apply this
theory when it basically eliminates the potential for pre-impact fright claims
in survival suits. In Fogarty v. Campbell, a federal court, while applying
Kansas law, examined some of the policy reasons for utilizing this rule. The
court stated that this approach "appears functionally equivalent" to the
rule set forth in the Restatement(Second) of Torts section 436A: "If the actor's
conduct is negligent as creating an unreasonable risk of causing either bodily
harm or emotional disturbance to another, and it results in such emotional
disturbance alone, without bodily harm or other compensable damage,
the actor is not liable for such emotional disturbance."40 The comments to
section 436A describe three justifications for the Restatement's position.4 1
First, emotional disturbance that does not result in physical manifestation
is viewed as "trivial."42 In performing a balancing test, the result is that
the emotional harm "is likely to be so temporary, so evanescent, and so
relatively harmless and unimportant, that the task of compensating for it
would unduly burden the courts and the defendants." 43 Second, without
a physical injury component, optimistic plaintiffs could bring frivolous
or fraudulent claims.44 The floodgates may open to include bogus claims
because "emotional disturbance may be too easily feigned, depending ...
very largely upon the subjective testimony of the plaintiff."45 Third, a bodily
injury requirement is prescribed because pure mental injury is not deemed
to be sufficient where the defendant lacks intent to cause physical harm.46

39 Id. at 322.
40 Fogarty, 640 F. Supp. at 957-58 (quoting
(1965)).

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

§ 436A cmt. b (1965).
958 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

§ 436A

41 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

Fogarty, 64o F. Supp.
b (1965)).
42

at

43 Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
44 Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
45 Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

§ 436A
§ 436A
§ 436A

OF TORTS

§ 436A

cmt.

cmt. b (1965)).
cmt. b (1965)).
cmt. b (1965)).

46 Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 436A cmt. b (1965)). The Restatement
does not require physical manifestation when a defendant acts intending to cause or in
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A comparative analysis is adopted in these pre-impact fright negligence
cases, and the courts feel that a physical injury tips the scales in favor of
imposing liability for emotional disturbance.47
The Restatement's approach and the physical manifestation requirement
adopted in Kansas, however, are subject to criticism. 48 The Fogarty court
mentioned the viewpoint of one commentator who believed that the
odds of a physical manifestation resulting from a short-term emotional
trauma could be extremely rare.49 The court also stated that the physical
injury requirement runs the risk of "[barring] a truly distressed (but nonimpacted) plaintiff from attempting to convince a jury that his complaints
are genuine."so The low probability of finding a physical manifestation
caused by emotional damage might also encourage potential plaintiffs to
lie or fabricate a physical manifestation just to get their claims heard."'
From this perspective, the physical manifestation requirement might be
perpetuating the very actions it attempts to avoid. Despite these criticisms,
the reasons set forth in the Restatement and in cases decided by courts
following the physical manifestation requirement theory are sound. This
approach, when added to or in substitution of the impact theory, prevents
speculation surrounding pre-impact fright and fosters predictability within
the jurisdiction.

III.

APPROACH TAKEN BY JURISDICTIONS THAT RECOGNIZE
PRE-IMPACT FRIGHT

Judicial recognition of pre-impact fright followed a long line of
expansion in damages awarded for emotional distress.s" Courts first enlarged
this field by recognizing intentional infliction of emotional distress as an
independent cause of action." Initially, only the impact theory gave rise to a
cognizable claim, but eventually courts accepted the physical manifestation
requirement through the "zone of danger" test.5 4 Recently, courts have
5
moved beyond the impact rule and the physical injury-requirements
56
to allow for awards that focus on the psychological stress itself. This
reckless disregard of causing emotional harm or distress.
47 See Fogarty, 64o F. Supp. at 957-58, 961-63; see also Nye v. Commonwealth, 480 A.2d
318,322 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984).
48 Fogarty, 64o F. Supp. at 962-63.
49 Id. at 962.
So Id.

51 See id.
52 Turezyn, supra note
53 Id. at 886-87.
54 Id. at 887-906.
55 See supra Parts I-II.

15, at 886-06.

56 Turezyn, supra note 15, at 886-9o6. However, it is worth noting that this line of cases
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movement recognizes emotional distress as a legitimate medical condition
worthy of compensation, and it utilizes both modern technology and science
to bolster its argument that the emotional distress experienced before an
accident can be proven despite the victim's death."
One influential decision that paved the way toward pre-impact fright was
Maryland's Beynon v. Montgomery Cablevision Ltd. Partnership." The Court
of Appeals of Maryland explored the issue of whether pre-impact fright
damages may be awarded in cases where the victim dies upon impact. 9
The significance of this case lies not only in its adoption of pre-impact
fright as a valid tort claim, but also in the in-depth analysis presented by
the court that explored the various arguments made and stances taken by
jurisdictions across the country in response to the issue. The court outlined
how other jurisdictions dealt with the impact and physical injury theories
that had previously permeated the pre-impact fright scene.60
After reviewing the jurisdictions both in favor of and opposed to
recognition of pre-impact fright as a compensable action, the court
determined that "the cases upholding the recoverability of pre-impact
fright... are more persuasive and compatible with Maryland law."' Because
the jurisdictions acting as advocates of the pre-impact rule persuaded the
Maryland court, it is useful to explore the decisions in these jurisdictions.
The recent trend of acceptance shows no uniformity by courts in their
reasoning, but the decisions can be broken into three different groups of
thought.
A. Jurisdictionsthat Recognize Pre-ImpactFrightby Expandingthe Impact Rule
One group of jurisdictions justified recognition of pre-impact fright by
broadening the scope of the impact rule. 62 These courts desired to follow the
common law approach adopted in their jurisdictions, so they manipulated
the impact rule to include the altered timing sequence of pre-impact fright
cases.
Typically, the impact rule requires that the victim's pain and suffering
follow the physical impact of the event.63 The required chain of causation
seeks to cure any speculation or evidentiary concerns that might arise
has not involved consideration of pre-contact or pre-near miss distress.
57 See Fogarty v. Campbell 66 Express, Inc., 640 F. Supp. 953, 963 (D. Kan. 1986).
58 Beynon v. Montgomery Cablevision Ltd. P'ship, 718 A.2d I161 (Md. 1998).
59 See id.at I163.
6o Seeid.at I168-79.
6 i Id. at I179.
62 See Haley v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 746 E2d 311,314-15 (5th Cir. 1984); Solomon

v. Warren, 54o F.2d 777, 793 (5th Cir. 1976); Monk v. Dial, 441 S.E.2d 857, 859 (Ga. Ct. App.

1994)63 Solomon, 540 F2d at 793.
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from emotional distress claims.' This group of jurisdictions, however,
acknowledged a loophole within the impact rule sequence of events.
Rather than apply the impact rule strictly, these courts decided that the
timing of the impact in relation to the proclaimed emotional distress is
not important. A federal court applying Florida law questioned the timing
element of the impact rule and stated, "we are unable to discern any reason
based on either law or logic for rejecting a claim because in this case ...
this sequence was reversed."6 ' Louisiana law has also been interpreted as
allowing a shift in the sequence of events for emotional distress claims.
A federal court applying Louisiana law in a survival action for pre-impact
fright involving an airplane crash declared that "[w]e are not prepared to
conclude that the Louisiana courts would sever such an 'ordeal' into before
and after impact components." 66 The Court of Appeals of Georgia also took
this approach when stating there was "no requirement that the physical
injury precede the mental pain and suffering.""7 These courts continue to
utilize the impact requirement of the impact rule, but they relax the rule by
allowing the impact to occur either before or after the mental anxiety.
In theory, the cited courts raise a valid point about the significance of
whether an impact occurs before or after the fright or anxiety. Why should
it matter whether the fright arises out of anticipation of an impact or as an
effect of the impact? If the purpose of recognizing emotional distress claims
is to compensate for mental suffering rather than any physical component,
then it makes sense that an emotional response due to fear rather than
physical contact is compensable. But altering the sequence of the impact
rule defeats the very purpose of the rule.
The impact rule seeks to resolve causation issues that often arise in
cases of emotional distress. By requiring that physical contact precede
the emotional injury, the impact rule protects dockets from speculative
claims. 68 When these jurisdictions accepted pre-impact fright by expanding
the impact rule, their logic was flawed. The purpose of the impact rule is
to resolve proof problems that arise in the area of causation in pre-impact
fright claims, and these jurisdictions undermine the purpose of the rule
by changing the sequence of events. Though the courts in this group raise
a valid point about the timing sequence required by the impact rule, it is
faulty legal analysis to accept pre-impact fright using an amended impact
rule in this manner.

64 See supraPart I.
65 Solomon, 54o F2d at 793.
66 Haley, 746 F.2d at 314.

67 Monk, 441 S.E.2d at 859 (citation omitted).
68 See supranotes 18-19 and accompanying text.
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B. Jurisdictionsthat Recognize Pre-ImpactFrightby Loosening the
PhysicalManifestation Requirement
Another group of jurisdictions accepting claims for pre-impact fright
recognized the cause of action by loosening the physical manifestation
requirement. The physical injury rule stands for the proposition that in
order for a claim of emotional distress to be actionable, a physical injury must
result from the emotional injury.69This requirement helps solve evidentiary
problems surrounding emotional distress claims because these suits are
vulnerable to frivolous claims or lofty speculation without a physical injury
connected to the distress." The courts taking this approach propose that
the requirement of "physical injury" should not be taken literally." Rather,
it should be viewed as encompassing any physical evidence of emotional
distress.72 Maryland adopted this perspective.
The Court of Appeals of Maryland considered the evolved meaning
of "physical" injury when it permitted a pre-impact fright claim after
examining prior case law." It determined that "the term 'physical' is not
used in its ordinary dictionary sense. Instead, it is used to represent that
the injury for which recovery is sought is capableof objective determination."74
This poses the question of what type of evidence constitutes objective
determination of emotional distress. Anticipating this question, the
Maryland court described two broad categories of "physical injury"
evidence that would meet the objective determination standard.- The first
type "pertain[s] to manifestations of a physical injury through evidence
of an external condition or by symptoms of a pathological or physiological
state." 6 The second type is more broadly stated as "evidence indicative of
a 'mental state."'7 While these explanations are still somewhat vague, it is
evident that Maryland has expanded the physical injury requirement to
include not only physical injuries of the victim, but also physical evidence
surrounding the event which could indicate an opportunity for the victim
to experience mental anxiety.
In Beynon v. Montgomery CablevisionLtd.Partnership,the Court ofAppeals
of Maryland found that the pre-impact fright claim passed the physical injury
test because an objective determination of the emotional anxiety could

69 See supra note 33.
70 See supra Part II.
71 See Beynon v. Montgomery Cablevision Ltd. P'ship,
72 See id. at i i82.
73
74
75
76
77

718 A.2d

Id
Id. (quoting Vance v. Vance,
Id. (quoting Vance, 4o8 A.2d
Id. (quoting Vance, 4o8 A.2d
Id. (quoting Vance, 4o8 A.2d

4o8 A.2d 728, 733 (Md. 1979).
at 733).
at 733).
at 733).

I161,

i182 (Md.

1998).
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be made." The new objective determination requirement of the physical
injury rule was satisfied by "the fatal injuries he sustained as a result of the
feared impact-the automobile accident"79 and "by the [71.51 feet of skid
marks that . . . resulted from the decedent's apprehension of impending

death, and the collision itself,"' both of which could independently satisfy
the new physical injury test.
The approach adopted by Maryland in Beynon indicates that death itself
may serve as physical evidence of emotional distress. It also appears that
any other objective evidence, such as skid marks, which indicate the possibility
of a victim experiencing emotional anxiety would satisfy the physical
injury rule. Extending the physical injury rule in this way, however,
merely perpetuates the very problems that the physical injury rule was
instituted to eliminate. Problems of frivolous claims and speculation, which
commonly accompany emotional distress suits, are not cured by expanding
the physical requirement to include any objective determination of injury.
Rather, this invites opportunities for more litigation and unsubstantiated
inferences being made to find any physical evidence that could support a
claim for pre-impact fright damages. While the Maryland court may have
justifiable reasons for wanting to grant awards for pre-impact fright suits, its
support for doing so is weak. Broadening the physical injury requirement
to include objective evidence at the scene of the accident or allowing the
death of a victim itself to stand as evidence practically eliminates the need
for a "physical injury" in its literal sense.
C. Jurisdictions that Recognize Pre-Impact Fright by Permitting Inferences of
EmotionalAnxiety with no PhysicalInjury Requirement
While some jurisdictions seek to expand the physical injury rule to
incorporate pre-impact fright, other courts have eliminated the requirement
altogether, thus allowing the emotional distress to speak for itself. Rather
than seek external evidence to substantiate the emotional distress claims,
these courts have relied on the proposition that jurors and judges are
capable of drawing inferences that could logically link emotional distress
to an act of negligence when physical evidence is lacking. Even without
a physical demonstration to prove a victim's mental anxiety, these courts
point to other proof that is available to fact finders.
For example, New York law has been interpreted by federal courts as
permitting a claim for emotional trauma "where the plaintiff can produce
evidence from which a jury could infer that the decedent was aware of the
danger and suffered from pre-impact terror.""' In Malacynski v. McDonnell
78
79
8o
81

Id.
Id.
Id.
Malacynski v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 565 F. Supp. 105, io6 (S.D.N.Y 1983).
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Douglas Corp., a plaintiff in a survival action sought to introduce evidence
of pre-impact fright from a plane crash." The court found that summary
judgment in favor of the defendant was inappropriate because "testimony
at trial of an eyewitness to the crash . . . may support an inference that the

decedent knew she was in imminent danger and should therefore recover
for pre-impact fright."" Here, testimony about the incident and the mere
potential of a victim's recognition of impending death or injury was enough
evidence to indicate the possible existence of pre-impact fear.
Nebraska also granted jurors' discretion in determining whether a
victim could have plausibly experienced emotional distress before his
or her death." When faced with no real evidence of the decedent's preimpact fright before a fatal motorcycle crash, the court allowed the jury to
examine the issue because "the personal representative's offers of proof
nonetheless provide a basis upon which the jury certainly need not, but
could, if it wished, find that [the] decedent .. . apprehended and feared
his impending death during the [five] seconds ... before he was crushed
and thus killed."" The court adopted the view that witness testimony
that raises the possibility of an emotional distress claim, even for a narrow
window of time, is acceptable to formulate the existence of an injury.8 By allowing juries to exercise such judgment in the face of limited
evidence, this method compounds the problems generally associated
with pre-impact fright. Evidentiary problems, mere speculation, and
potential for fraudulent claims become a greater concern for courts that
allow fact finders to draw inferences based on little or no physical evidence
of emotional distress. It provides jurors or judges too much latitude and
discretion. These jurisdictions seek to eliminate barriers to pre-impact
fright claims, but in doing so, they may be abolishing the fourth necessary
element to a negligence claim: an injury."

IV. THE PRACTICAL

EFFECT:

IS

PRE-IMPACT FRIGHT

NEEDED To REDRESS PLAINTIFFS?

A. Pre-ImpactFrightAwards Are Unpredictableand Often Slight
The practical effect of recognizing pre-impact fright as a component of
a valid negligence claim is questionable. Does a court's decision to award
these damages truly compensate plaintiffs in a meaningful way as compared
Beynon, 718 A.2d at 1174 (citing Malacynski, 565 F. Supp. at 107).
83 Id. (citing Malacynski, 565 F. Supp. at 107).
84 Nelson v. Dolan, 434 N.W.2d 25,32 (Neb. 1989).
85 Id.
86 Id.
87 See Helton v. Montgomery, 595 S.W.2d 257, 258 (Ky. Cc. App. 1980) (stating that
injury is a necessary element of a negligence claim).
82
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to the usual survival action damages, and if so, can uniformity be found in
the amounts of pre-impact fright awards? An examination of cases in which
damages have been awarded answers those questions in the negative.
A survey of the cases analyzed in this Note reveals a wide range of
damages awarded for pre-impact fright. On the high end of awards lies a
case in Texas where the Supreme Court of Texas upheld a jury award of
$500,000 for "mental anguish the decedents suffered from the time of the
plane's break-up until it hit the ground.""8 Furthermore, a NewYork appeals
court found that even though a jury award of $239,125 was "excessive," an
award of $100,000 for pre-impact fright a decedent suffered in a fatal car
accident would be "ample compensation."" These figures illustrate that
damage awards may be significant; however, the New York and Texas court
awards are not characteristic.
Many pre-impact fright awards are $20,000 or less. In Michigan, a
decedent's estate was awarded $500 in damages for the pre-impact fright of
a decedent who was struck by a falling boxcar." Even in Texas, where the
Supreme Court of Texas upheld one of the largest pre-impact judgments,
another fright award for a mere $5,000 was granted to compensate a
decedent's estate for the fright he experienced before a truck backed
over him.9 1 Several other jurisdictions have granted awards in the range
of $10,000 to $20,000 for pre-impact fright associated with similar events
to those described above: plane crashes, automobile accidents, and other
tortious events. 92
Certainly the specific facts of each case are unique, but such a disparity
in awards for pre-impact fright is unsettling. At its core, pre-impact fright
is a claim for emotional distress designed to compensate decedents for
the fear they experienced in anticipation of the injury that caused death.
Theoretically and morally this sounds appealing, but how can fear of death
be quantified into such diverse figures? In most of the cited cases, the time
frame of emotional anxiety was quite brief, and even the circumstances
surrounding death were similar in many cases. It does not make practical
sense, then, that one plaintiff is awarded hundreds of thousands of dollars
in damages and another plaintiff is awarded only a few thousand dollars to
compensate for the same injury: fear.
It is recognized that disparate awards often arise in the context of other

88 Yowell v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 703 S.W.2d 63o, 634 (Tex. 1986).
89 Lang v. Bouju, 667 N.YS.ad 44o, 442 (App. Div. 1997).
90 Kozar v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 320 F. Supp. 335, 364-66 (W.D. Mich. 1970).
91 Green v. Hale, 590 S.W2d 231, 238 (Tex. Civ.App. 1979).
92 See Haley v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. 746 E2d 311, 317 (5th Cir. 1984) (affirming judgment for $i5,ooo); Solomon v. Warren, 54o F.2d 777, 792 (5th Cir. 1976) (affirming
judgment for $io,ooo); United States v. Furumizo, 381 E2d 965 (9th Cir. 1967) (affirming
judgment for $15,ooo); Mo. Pac. R.R. v. Lane, 720 S.W.2d 83o, 833 (Tex. App. 1986) (affirming
judgment for $19,500).
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types of tort claims, such as pain and suffering awards." But one can assume
that juries and judges have physical evidence, medical reports, or victim
testimony upon which to base awards granted for these types of claims.
The unique nature of pre-impact fright in mortal injury cases, however,
results in a lack of proof. The victim is unable to testify as to his or her
fear, and the emotional injury of fear before death is much more difficult to
quantify than a physical injury or emotional distress in a survivor.
Although this Note is not an exhaustive review of the practical
implications of pre-impact fright, the brief overview displays facts that not
only bolster the theoretical arguments posed by opponents of pre-impact
fright claims but also provide new reasons for rejecting the claims. The
lack of uniformity in the implementation of pre-impact fright even within
a single jurisdiction is one more reason that pre-impact fright should be
abandoned as a tort claim. The foundational problems of speculation and
lack of evidence lead courts and juries to award compensation that often
does not accurately reflect the injury suffered.
B. Alternative Claims May be Brought by Plaintiffs that Redress Their Injuries
Betterthan Pre-ImpactFright
In mortal injury cases, the estate of the deceased may typically seek
compensation for damages using both wrongful death and survival
statutes. The damages recoverable under these statutes commonly include
"compensatory damages," as well as "awards of nominal and/or punitive
damages."" One can assume that this wide statutory leeway provides
plaintiffs the authority to seek damages for the decedent's economic loss
and pain and suffering, in addition to punitive damages.' With these
other avenues of redress available, the question arises whether pre-impact
fright is even needed. If plaintiffs may seek redress through other more
predictable and legally sound avenues, then why should a court expend the
time and resources needed to formulate an award for pre-impact fright?
Proponents of pre-impact fright in survival actions argue that the
emotional distress felt by a victim before a fatal accident is a distinct claim
and decedents should not be denied an opportunity to seek compensation
for this suffering. They claim that "ilt is illogical . . . to allow someone
who consciously suffers for a short period following an injury-producing
event to have a jury evaluate his or her claim while denying that chance
to someone confronted with impending death who does not otherwise
93 Mark Geistfeld, Placing a Price on Pain and Suffering: A Method for Helping Juries
Determine Tort Damagesfor Nonmonetary Injuries, 83 CALIF. L. REV. 773, 776-77 (I995).
94 See DAMAGES IN TORT AcrloNs, supra note 5, § 20.02[I ](b).
95 Id.
96 See id. These damages serve merely as an example of the types of damages potentially
available to plaintiffs, not an exclusive list of damages.
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suffer from the fatal collision."" In theory, this statement is logical, but it
does not work as a practical matter. The way courts implement pre-impact
fright in survival actions seems to be an award of damages for emotional
distress using evidence that would normally constitute pain and suffering.
Courts' moral consciences want to compensate decedents, so they justify
the use of pre-impact fright by expanding its coverage to include situations
in which there is no actual evidence of emotional distress.98 By allowing
physical evidence of potential emotional distress or permitting inferences
to be drawn, courts have essentially awarded more damages for pain and
suffering under the heading "pre-impact fright."" From this perspective, it
appears that the way courts implement pre-impact fright renders the claim
practically meaningless. Courts could accomplish the same result using
the more traditional claim of pain and suffering. This would compensate
decedents without compromising sound legal theory.

V.

OTHER RECOMMENDATIONS: LIMITATIONS ON
PRE-IMPACT FRIGHT DAMAGES

This Note stands for the proposition that pre-impact fright in mortal
injury cases is tainted by problems of both faulty legal theory and poor
implementation and should be abolished because of these deficiencies.
It advocates for courts to reject pre-impact fright and use other types of
claims to accomplish the goal of redressing deceased plaintiffs. But what
about those courts that have already adopted pre-impact fright or will adopt
it as a valid legal claim in the future despite its many faults? Recognizing
the reality of a trend in favor of pre-impact fright, this Note also reluctantly
provides recommendations on how to limit the negative effects of preimpact fright without completely abolishing it.
A. Courts ShouldImplement a Maximum Recovery Rule on
Pre-ImpactFrightDamages
Because pre-impact fright is so speculative and opens the door for
disparate awards of damages, courts should place a limit on the amount a
plaintiff can recover for a pre-impact fright claim. One way of applying this
rule is to create a policy stating that similar claims should warrant similar
awards, and the amounts of these awards should rise and fall as a group.'*
While some scholars may think this is the responsibility of the legislature,
a few courts have taken it upon themselves to limit recovery in this way.
97 Kroll, supra note 8, at 468.
98 See supra Part III.
99 See supra Part III.
oo See Louisa Ann Collins, Comment, Pre- andPost-ImpactPain andSuffering andAfental
Anguish in Aviation Accidents, 59 J.AIR L. & COM. 403,436-37 (1993-1994).
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For example, the Fifth Circuit implemented a version of the maximum
recovery rule, which is used "to keep awards low, allowing them to grow at
a permissible rate in all similar cases." 01 This circuit's maximum recovery
rule does not place a standard monetary amount that must be used in all
awards." 2 Rather, it ensures that an award is not egregious by requiring
courts to analyze "all relevant cases that are similar in factual background .
.. to determine the limit of the maximum recovery rule."10 This rule helps
cure one of the practical effects of pre-impact fright, lack of uniformity, and
creates a level of predictability.
A court also could implement a maximum recovery rule that states a strict
monetary value on pre-impact claims. Opponents of placing a maximum
figure on fright claims might argue that each case is unique and warrants
an analysis of the facts, which might lend itself to a higher award. But, a
maximum figure does not require that all judgments reach this cap amount.
And, more importantly, an award for pre-impact fright is itself problematic
because the claim is so speculative and the nature of a claim for emotional
distress in a survival action is difficult to quantify. A maximum recovery
rule would create not only predictability for parties but also stability and
ease for court systems.
B. Courts Should Use Remittituras a Methodto Limit Pre-ImpactFrightAwards
and Ensure the Awards Are Justiled
Another way courts can limit the amount of damages awarded for preimpact fright is to use remittitur. Remittitur is a review mechanism-"a
process by which a court compels a plaintiff to choose between reduction
of an excessive verdict and a new trial."'" When using remittitur, a court
reviews ajury's award ofdamages and proposes a reduced award in an amount
the court feels is more reasonable (often fifty percent). 0 The plaintiff must
then choose whether to take the remittitur amount or undergo the hassle of
a new trial. 0 6 Plaintiffs will often choose the reduced amount, thus making
remittitur an effective way for courts to limit pre-impact awards. 0
The Fifth Circuit also uses remittitur as a way to limit jury awards for
pre-impact fright. 0 In determining whether remittitur is necessary, and
if so, what is a proper remittitur amount, courts such as the Fifth Circuit,
ioi Id. at 437.
I02 Id. at 436 (quoting Douglass v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 897 E2d 1336, 1344 (5th Cir.

1990)).
103 Id. at 437.
104 Id. (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
105 See id. (citation omitted).

io6 Id. at437-38.
107 See id. at 437-38 (citation omitted).

io8 Id. at 438.
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have looked at each of the following factors: "(1) fairness to the plaintiff;
(2) fairness to the defendant; (3) judicial economy; (4) the constitutional
preference for jury trials; and (5) non-constitutionally mandated public
policy favoring trial by jury."o' While analyzing these factors grants trial
judges significant discretion in determining a remittitur amount,"0 it serves
as a useful safeguard against juries awarding extreme damages to plaintiffs
for speculative and unfounded pre-impact fright claims.
C. Courts Should Include Pre-Impact Fright as a Part of Pain and Suffering
Damages Upon Proofthat the Harm Causedby the DefendantActually Occurred
One approach suggested by Professor Kathleen M. Turezyn is that
pre-impact fright should be an extension of a plaintiff's claim for physical
injury."' While pre-impact fright would maintain its separate identity as
redress for a person's emotional distress due to the anticipation of a tragic
event, this approach removes all the rules and requirements normally
implemented by courts."' Instead, it focuses on one prerequisite for a preimpact fright claim."' Requirements of proof and physical injury would
be eliminated and instead "courts [wiould allow recovery for pre-impact
distress ... [w]hen the defendant negligently places a victim in danger of
serious physical harm or death, and injury or death does in fact occur as a
result of the feared event."" 4 Using this method, a pre-impact fright claim
would regularly succeed when a defendant is found negligent in causing
physical harm to a victim."s
While this approach might not be legally sound in its use of a physical
injury as proof of an emotional injury, its practical benefits are numerous.
It eliminates the need for useless litigation or frivolous or fraudulent
claims brought by plaintiffs because "so long as the plaintiff can establish
to the satisfaction of the fact-finder that he or she experienced distress,
courts should allow recovery."" 6 This approach adds consistency to awards
for pre-impact fright and fosters predictability for plaintiffs in assessing
whether their cases have potential for pre-impact fright claims. Problems
of causation and injury still exist when using this approach, but for courts
unwilling to abolish pre-impact fright, this method eases the negative
practical effects of implementing pre-impact fright.

io9

Id. (quoting Irene Sann, Remittitur Practicein the FederalCourts, 76 COLUM. L. REV.

299, 301 (1976)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

i to id. (citation omitted).
iii Turezyn, supra note I5, at 931.
112 See id.
113 See id.

114 Id.
115 See id.
II6 Id.
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CONCLUSION

Recent legal trends show a movement towards recognition of preimpact fright. Courts often feel the need to redress plaintiffs for the
distress felt by decedents in anticipation of their deaths, and therefore rely
on legal theory to support their recognition of pre-impact fright damages.
The problem, however, is that courts' legal justifications for instituting preimpact fright damages are flawed. Not only do courts often negate the
very legal theories they are endorsing by pursuing pre-impact fright, but
also the practical effects of their judgments are questionable. The awards
have been disparate and show little or no predictability as to what "fear of
death or substantial bodily harm" is worth. For these reasons, it appears that
pre-impact fright is an impractical claim. Its purpose is evident and noble,
but it opens the door to an area of the law that is unpredictable, speculative,
and unsubstantiated by legal theory. This Note proposes that in survival
actions, pre-impact fright should be abolished as a legal claim and courts
should redress plaintiffs through other methods and claims where evidence
is more substantial. Recognizing, however, that many courts have already
accepted pre-impact fright as a claim within their jurisdictions, this Note
also provides a few recommendations that serve to limit the negative effects
of pre-impact fright. If courts choose to recognize pre-impact fright claims,
they should use one of the various methods outlined in this Note"' to limit
the amount of damages awarded.

117 SeesupraPartVB-C.

